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Abstract 
Martin Luther’s signature “two kingdoms” teaching of the sixteenth century was 
an early and innovative theory of secularization that lies at the heart of historical 
Scandinavian culture.  Defying the organic medieval models of Western Christendom, 
Luther separated the heavenly and earthly kingdoms, the saint and the sinner, faith and 
reason, church and the state, Gospel and the Law, as well as the spiritual and secular 
uses of law, government and authority.  Though God is separated from day-to-day life, 
Luther wrote, God is still hidden in the earthly kingdom” and can be seen through 
various “masks,” “mists,” and “mimes.”  Though the visible church is separated from the 
state and other institutions, religion remains pervasive in the common callings of every 
person to be God’s prophet, priest and king in every vocation and location of life.  
Luther’s two kingdoms theory is a complicated and controversial part of this thinking, but 
it is worth re-exploring today as pluralistic Scandinavia faces strong new pressures of 
both sacralization and secularization and seeks to discern anew “the hidden sacraliity of 
the secular.” 
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José Casanova has shown that the modern process of secularization has at least 
three dimensions: (1) the separation of the economic, scientific, and governmental 
spheres from the religious sphere of the church and the specialization of religion within 
its own sphere; (2) the decline of religious belief and practice in an ethnic community or 
political nation, often accompanied by the rise of science and technology as a more 
reliable guide; and (3) the privatization of religion.  Casanova warns us, however, 
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against confusing “the historical processes of secularization proper with the alleged and 
anticipated consequences which those processes were supposed to have upon 
religion.”  The differentiation and specialization of institutional spheres of religion and 
non-religion do not necessarily coincide with or require the decline or privatization of 
religion.1 
Kim Knott and other contributors to this volume concur in this latter judgment.  
They show how even modern purportedly secularized Western societies retain 
important sacred or religious dimensions.2  These religious phenomena are not only 
contained within the privatized sanctuaries of conscience, or the specialized settings of 
worship where secularization theorists would expect to find them.  Religion is also 
present in all kinds of spaces and specialties that would seem to be hermetically and 
hermeneutically closed to religion – in state schools, hospitals, and prisons, in state 
legislatures, courts, and tribunals, in the discourses of human rights, public policy, and 
public health alike.3  Indeed, our public life altogether, Tryvge Wyller and Rosemarie 
van den Breemer show, is suffused with religious values, beliefs, rituals, methods, and 
frameworks – sometimes hidden, sometimes syncretized, sometimes masquering under 
other labels, but all vitally important to communal identity, integrity, and function.   
This volume endeavors to map and measure this “hidden sacrality of the secular” 
in various Nordic countries, whose processes of secularization and sacralization do not 
fit easily into conventional secularization models.  After all, this region -- long known as 
Europe’s leader of secular culture, social experimentation, and innovative social welfare 
– has until very recently maintained an established Lutheran church and a public school 
curriculum bent on perpetuating its traditional religious and moral norms and habits.4  
This religious substratum has provided a powerful but often forgotten foundation to the 
communal harmony and individual happiness of Nordic lands that have long been the 
envy of the world.  To be sure, Scandinavia has known conflicts – between Swedes and 
Danes, Eastern and Western Nordic Lutherans, Catholics and Protestants, Christians 
and non-Christians -- that sometimes yielded violence and bloodshed in centuries past.5  
These old tensions have been replaced with striking new tensions between established 
churches and religious freedom for all, between national sovereignty and European 
integration, between the social welfare state and global capitalism, between comfortable 
Nordic customs and the challenges of new immigrants, particularly Muslims who have 
arrived in impressive numbers and are making strong new demands.  Just as they are 
embarking on new campaigns of separating church and state today, Nordic countries 
 
1 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 19 
and his chapter herein.  See also Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), 423. 
2 See esp. Kim Knott, The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis (London: Equinox, 2005), and her 
chapter herein. 
3 See the chapters herein by Johannes van der Venn, Inger Furseth, Knut Ruyter, Hannah Peeters, and 
Helge Årsheim.  
4 See the chapters herein by Eivind Smith, Rosemarie van den Breemer, and Tryvge Wyller.  
5 See the chapters herein by Dag Thorkildsen.  
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are struggling to find new spaces and places to nurture the religious resources that 
have been so vital to the preservation of Nordic culture.6  
In this chapter, I would like to explore some of the Lutheran sources of traditional 
Nordic culture – in particular the original vision of Martin Luther (1483-1546) set out in 
his “two kingdoms theory.”7  This, I submit, was an early and innovative theory of 
secularization whose insights can still be useful for the modern Nordic project of 
discerning “the hidden sacrality of the secular.”8  Defying the organic medieval models 
of Western Christendom, Luther separated the heavenly and earthly kingdoms, the 
church and the state, the Gospel and the Law, the spiritual and civil uses of law, 
government and authority.  Though God is separated from day to day life, Luther wrote, 
“God is still hidden in the earthly kingdom” and can be seen through various “masks,” 
“mists,” and “mimes”.9  Though the visible church is separated from the state and other 
institutions, religion remains pervasive in the common callings of every person to be 
God’s prophet, priest and king in every vocation and location of life.  Luther’s two 
kingdoms theory is a complicated and controversial part of this thinking.   But it is worth 
re-exploring even today – indeed especially today – as Lutheran Scandinavia faces 
strong new pressures of both sacralization and secularization.  
 
Theory of Being 
Luther was a master of the dialectic -- of holding two doctrinal opposites in 
tension and of exploring ingeniously the intellectual power of this tension.  Many of his 
favorite dialectics were set out in the Bible and well-rehearsed in the Christian tradition--
spirit and flesh, soul and body, faith and works, heaven and hell, grace and nature, the 
kingdom of God versus the kingdom of Satan, the things that are God's and the things 
that are Caesar's, and more.10  Some of the dialectics were more distinctly Lutheran in 
accent --Law and Gospel, sinner and saint, servant and lord, inner man and outer man, 
passive justice and active justice, alien righteousness and proper righteousness, civil 
uses and theological uses of the law, among others. 
Luther developed these dialectical doctrines separately between 1515 to 1545 -- 
at different paces, in varying levels of detail, and with uneven attention to how one 
doctrine fit with others.  He and his followers eventually jostled together several 
 
6 See Lisbet Christoffersen, Kjell Å Moedeer, and Svend Andersen, eds., Law and Religion in the 21st 
Century: Nordic Perspectives (Copenhagen: Djøf Publishers, 2010). 
7 This balance of the chapter is excerpted and updated from my Law and Protestantism: The Legal 
Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), which includes 
detailed citations to the literature. I will be using the following short-hand references to Luther’s writings: 
LW = Luther’s Works, trans. and ed Jaroslav Pelikan et al., 55 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-
1968); WA = D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 78 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883-
1987); WA TR = D. Martin Luthers Werke: Tischreden, 7 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1912- ). 
8 For an interesting recent book that distills the modern debates about whether the Lutheran Reformation 
was a movement of “secularization” or “Christianization,” see Anna Marie Johnson and John A. Maxfield, 
eds., The Reformation as Christianization (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). 
9 See sources in my God’s Joust, God’s Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005). 
10 See Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82ff., 193ff. 
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doctrines under the broad umbrella of the two kingdoms theory.  This theory came to 
describe at once: (1) the distinctions between the fallen realm and the redeemed realm, 
the City of Man and the City of God, the Reign of the Devil and the Reign of Christ; (2) 
the distinctions between the sinner and the saint, the flesh and the spirit, the inner man 
and the outer man; (3) the distinctions between the visible church and the invisible 
church, the church as governed by civil law and the church as governed by the Holy 
Spirit; (4) the distinctions between reason and faith, natural knowledge and spiritual 
knowledge; and (5) the distinctions between two kinds of righteousness, two kinds of 
justice, two uses of law.  
When Luther and his fellow reformers used the two kingdoms terminology, they 
often had one or two of these distinctions primarily in mind, sometimes without clearly 
specifying the same.  Rarely did all of these distinctions come in for a fully differentiated 
and systematic discussion and application.  The matter was complicated even further 
because both Anabaptists and Calvinists of the day eventually adopted and adapted the 
language of the two kingdoms as well -- each with their own confessional accents and 
legal applications that were sometimes in sharp tension with Luther’s and Lutheran 
views.11  It is thus worth spelling out Luther’s understanding of the two kingdoms in 
some detail, and then drawing out its implications for law, society, and politics. 
First and foremost for Luther, the two-kingdoms theory was an ontology, a theory 
of the two-fold nature of being or reality.  In his early writings, Luther often described 
this in the familiar Augustinian terms that he had learned in the monastery.  Augustine’s 
City of God was the perfect heavenly kingdom in the life hereafter.  It was already 
experienced but not yet fully realized by Christians who sojourn in the City of Man, in 
this earthly kingdom of space and time.12  Sometimes, Luther described this distinction 
in the grand terms of the Bible -- as the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan 
locked in perennial battle for the souls of humankind until the second coming of Christ 
and the ultimate overthrow of the Devil.13  Sometimes, Luther focused on the contrast 
between two classes of citizens in the world -- Christians who have accepted the 
lordship of Christ in the heavenly kingdom and non-Christians who submit only to the 
authorities of the earthly kingdom.14  These were quite different renderings of a basic 
ontological dualism, but they often came tumbling out together in Luther’s torrential 
prose.  For example, in a famous 1523 passage, Luther wrote:  
Here we must divide the children of Adam and all mankind 
into two parts, the first belonging to the kingdom of God (reych 
Gottis), the second to the kingdom of the world (reych der 
welt).  Those who belong to the kingdom of God are all true 
believers who are in Christ and under Christ, for Christ is king 
and lord in the kingdom of God.... [T]hese people need no 
 
11 See Robert Friedmann, The Theology of Anabaptism (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1973), 38ff.; David 
van Drunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social 
Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2010). 
12 LW 45:88-92, 104-108; LW 46:242-243; WA 36:385; WA 45:252ff.; WA TR 6, No. 7026.  
13 Ibid.  Luther writes: “Man’s will is like an animal standing between two riders.  If God is the rider, man 
goes and wills where God goes....  If Satan is the rider, man wills and goes where Satan goes.” WA 
18:635.  
14 LW 21:109; LW 23:316-319; WA 36:385. 
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worldly law or sword.  If all the world were composed of real 
Christians, that is, right believers, there would be no need for 
or benefits from prince, king, lord, sword, or law.  They would 
serve no purpose, since Christians have in their heart the Holy 
Spirit, who both teaches and makes them to do injustice to no 
one, to love everyone, and to suffer injustice and even death 
willingly and cheerfully at the hands of anyone....  
 
All who are not Christians belong to the kingdom of the world 
and are under the law.  There are few true believers, and still 
fewer who live a Christian life, who do not resist evil and 
indeed themselves do no evil.  For this reason, God has 
provided for them a different government (Regiment) beyond 
the Christian estate (Stand) and kingdom of God.  He 
subjected them to the sword so that, even though they would 
like to, they are unable to practice their wickedness, and if 
they do practice it they cannot do so without fear or with 
success and impunity....  
 
God has ordained two governments: the spiritual (geystliche), 
by which the Holy Spirit produces Christians and righteous 
people under Christ; and the temporal (welltliche), which 
restrains the non-Christian and the wicked.15 
 
As this quotation reveals, Luther believed that the two kingdoms (Reiche) were 
ruled by two authorities or governments (Regimente, Stände).  In his early years, Luther 
viewed these two authorities primarily through his favorite binocular of the Law and the 
Gospel.16  The earthly kingdom was governed by Law.  The heavenly kingdom was 
governed by Gospel.  Both the Law and the Gospel were ultimately forms of God’s 
authority and revelation.  But they had to be carefully distinguished.17  The Law was an 
authority of the sword; it brought coercion, bondage, and restraint.  The Gospel was an 
authority of the Word; it promised love, freedom, and charity.  In this world of space and 
time, both these authorities ruled concurrently, and a Christian believer needed to 
submit to each, and to resist their conflation.   
Paul says in I Timothy 1[:9], “the Law is not laid down for the 
righteous but for the lawless.”  Why is this?  It is because the 
righteous man of his own accord does all and more than the 
Law demands.  But the unrighteous do nothing that the Law 
demands; therefore, they need the Law to instruct, constrain, 
and compel them to do good.... In the same way a savage wild 
beast is bound with chains and ropes so that it cannot bite and 
tear as it would normally do, even though it would like to; 
 
15 WA 11:249-252.  
16 See WA 40:486.  
17 See, e.g., WA TR 1, No. 590, LW 54:105-107. 
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whereas a tame and gentle animal needs no restraint, but is 
harmless despite the lack of chains and ropes....  
 
If anyone attempted to rule the world by the Gospel and to 
abolish all earthly law and sword on the plea that all are 
baptized and Christian, and that, according to the Gospel, 
there shall be among them no law or sword -- or need for 
either -- ... he would be loosing the ropes and chains of the 
savage wild beasts and letting them bite and mangle 
everyone.... 
 
For this reason one must carefully distinguish between these 
two authorities.  Both must be permitted to remain; the one to 
produce righteousness, the other to bring about external 
peace and prevent evil deeds.  Neither one is sufficient in the 
world without the other.  No one can become righteous in the 
sight of God by means of the earthly government, without 
Christ’s spiritual government.  Christ’s government does not 
extend over all men; rather, Christians are always a minority 
in the midst of non-Christians.  Now where earthly government 
or law alone prevails, there sheer hypocrisy is inevitable, even 
though the commandments be God’s very own.  For without 
the Holy Spirit in the heart no one becomes truly righteous, no 
matter how fine the work he does.  On the other hand, where 
the spiritual government alone prevails over land and peoples, 
there wickedness is given free rein and the door is open for 
all manner of rascality, for the world as a whole cannot receive 
or comprehend it.18 
 
As this quotation reveals, Luther in this early period, tended to conflate (1) the 
theological category of Law -- the Old Testament dispensation of God that antedated 
the Gospel, with (2) the political category of law -- the positive laws promulgated by the 
magistrate.  The Law of God and the law of the magistrate were both part of the 
government of the earthly kingdom, and Luther at first did little to distinguish them.  The 
dangers of this early position soon became apparent.  For Luther, in this early period, 
also tended to conflate the image of the earthly kingdom as the evil realm of the Devil 
with that of the earthly kingdom as the political realm of the magistrate.  This double 
conflation led the early Luther dangerously close to intimating that not only the law of 
the magistrate but also the Law of God was part of the earthly kingdom of the Devil.  
Add Luther’s repeated and bitter attacks on Mosaic law, canon law, and Roman law 
alike, and it was easy to see how Luther’s early theory could lead an earnest follower 
straight into antinomianism -- into wholesale rejection of all law in favor of the freedom 
of the Christian Gospel.  
 
18 Ibid.  See also LW 9:136. 
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By the late 1520s, Luther thus moved to a more nuanced view of the temporal 
government that governed the earthly kingdom.  Luther’s earlier Augustinian picture of 
the earthly kingdom as the fallen and formless City of Man under the reign of the Devil 
faded into the background.  To the foreground came Luther’s new picture of the earthly 
kingdom as the natural realm, once a brilliant and perfect creation of God, but now 
darkened and distorted by the fall into sin.  Despite the fall, however, God in his grace 
had allowed the earthly kingdom to continue to exist.  God had also allowed the various 
natural laws and natural orders to continue to operate.  Luther referred many times to 
the natural laws of marriage and family, property and business born of God’s primal 
command to Adam and Eve in Paradise: “Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth 
and subdue it, and have dominion over [it].”19  Luther also pointed to the natural laws on 
the proper worship and honor of God, on coveting and homicide, on evidence and 
judicial procedure adumbrated in God’s primal confrontation with Cain immediately after 
Paradise.20  For Luther, each of these natural laws, created by God, continued to 
govern the earthly kingdom after the fall into sin.  
Not only the natural laws, but also the natural orders of creation continued to 
govern after the fall into sin. “God has ordained three orders or governments 
(hierarchias/Regimente)” to embody, elaborate, and enforce natural laws in the earthly 
kingdom, Luther wrote in 1539: “the household, the state, and the church,” or the ordo 
economicus, ordo politicus, and ordo ecclesiasticus as he elsewhere put it.21   
The first government (Regimente) is that of the home, from 
which the people come.  The second is that of the “state” 
(civitas), that is, the country, the people, princes, and lords, 
which we call the temporal government.  These [two 
governments] embrace everything -- children, property, 
money, animals, and so on.  The home must produce, 
whereas the city must guard, protect, and defend.  Then 
follows the third, God's own home and city, that is, the church, 
which must obtain people from the home and protection and 
defense from the state.  These are the three hierarchies 
ordained by God, ... the three high divine governments, the 
three divine, natural, and temporal laws of God.22  
  
All three of these orders, governments, or estates, Luther insisted, represented 
different dimensions of God’s authority and law in the earthly kingdom.  All three stood 
equal before God and before each other in discharging their essential natural tasks.  All 
three were needed to resist the power of sin and the Devil in the earthly kingdom.  All 
three deserved equally the obedience of those under their authority.  All three were 
essential to the preservation of life and law, order and obligation in the earthly kingdom.  
All three not only exercised the justice and wrath of God against sin, but also anticipated 
 
19 LW 1:69ff., quoting Gen. 1:28. 
20 LW 1:259ff. 
21 WA 39:/2:42.  See also LW 3:217; LW 37:364ff.; LW 41:177ff.  For anticipations of this doctrine in 
Luther’s earlier writings, see F. Edward Cranz, An Essay on the Development of Luther’s Thought on 
Justice, Law, and Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 153-178. 
22 WA 50:509. 
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the more perfect life and law of the heavenly kingdom.23  As Luther put it: “God wants 
the government of the earthly kingdom to be a symbol of ... the heavenly kingdom, like a 
mime or a mask.”24   
This “three-estate theory” (drei Ständelehre) became one of Luther’s signature 
contributions to the early differentiation of the church, state, and family spheres, which 
Casanova calls a first step in the “secularization process.”25  It provided Luther with a 
considerably more nuanced and positive theory of earthly law and government than 
some of his earlier statements had allowed.  His ontological picture of the world 
remained a basic dualism between a lower earthly kingdom and a higher heavenly 
kingdom.  But the earthly kingdom was now much more clearly a realm of divinely-
ordained authority and law, albeit perennially distorted by sin.  And the earthly kingdom 
was naturally subdivided into three orders of domestic, political, and ecclesiastical 
authority, each called to embrace and enforce God’s law, and each empowered to 
prohibit and punish human sin.  
 
Theory of the Person 
 The two kingdoms theory was not only an ontology, a theory of the two-fold 
nature of reality.  It was also an anthropology, a theory of the two-fold nature of the 
Christian person.  All persons in Christendom, Luther argued, share equally in a doubly 
paradoxical nature.  Each Christian is at once a saint and a sinner, righteous and 
reprobate, saved and lost -- simul iustus et peccator.26  At the same time, each Christian 
is at once a free lord who is subject to no one, and a dutiful servant who is subject to 
everyone.   
Every Christian "has a two-fold nature," Luther argued in expounding his famous 
doctrine of simul iustus et peccator.  We are at once body and soul, flesh and spirit, 
sinner and saint, “outer man and inner man.”  These “two men in the same man 
contradict each other” and remain perennially at war.27  On the one hand, as bodily 
creatures, we are born in sin and bound by sin.  By our carnal natures, we are prone to 
lust and lasciviousness, evil and egoism, perversion and pathos of untold dimensions.28  
Even the best of persons, even the titans of virtue in the Bible -- Abraham, David, Peter, 
and Paul -- sin all the time.29  In and of ourselves, we are totally depraved and 
deserving of eternal death.  On the other hand, as spiritual creatures, we are reborn in 
faith, and freed from sin.  By our spiritual natures, we are prone to love and charity, 
goodness and sacrifice, virtue and peacefulness.  Even the worst of persons, even the 
 
23 See LW 13:169: "These divine stations and orders have been established by God that in the world 
there may be a stable, orderly, and peaceful life, and that justice may be preserved.... For if God had not 
Himself instituted these stations and did not daily preserve them as his work, no particle of right would 
last even a moment.... [T]hese divine stations continue and remain throughout all kingdoms, as wide as 
the world and to the end of the world."  
24 WA 51:241. 
25 See Casanova, Public Religion.  See Wilhelm Maurer, Luthers Lehre von den drei Hierarchien und ihr 
mittelalterlischer Hintergrund (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1970). 
26 LW 31:344-347, 358-361.  See also LW 12:328; LW 27:230ff.; LW 32:173; WA 39/1:21, 492, 552. 
27 LW 31:344. 
28 LW 31:344, 358-361; see also LW 25:120-130, 204-213. 
29 LW 19:47-48; LW 23:146.  
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reprobate thief nailed on the cross next to Christ's, can be saved from sin.  In spite of 
ourselves, we are totally redeemed and assured of eternal life.30 
It is through faith in the Word of God, Luther argued, that a person moves from 
sinner to saint, from bondage to freedom.  This was the essence of Luther's doctrine of 
justification by faith alone.  No human work of any sort -- even worship, contemplation, 
meditation, charity, and other supposed meritorious conduct -- can make a person just 
and righteous before God.  For sin holds the person fast, and perverts his or her every 
work.  “One thing, and only one thing, is necessary for Christian life, righteousness, and 
freedom,” Luther declared.  “That one thing is the most holy Word of God, the Gospel of 
Christ.”31  To put one's faith in this Word, to accept its gracious promise of eternal 
salvation, is to claim one's freedom from sin and from its attendant threat of eternal 
damnation.  And it is to join the communion of saints that begins imperfectly in this life 
and continues perfectly in the life to come.  But a saint by faith remains a sinner by 
nature, Luther insisted, and the conflict of good and evil within the same person remains 
until death.32 
This brought Luther to a related paradox of human nature -- that each Christian is 
at once a lord who is subject to no one, and a priest who is servant to everyone.  On the 
one hand, Luther argued, “every Christian is by faith so exalted above all things that, by 
virtue of a spiritual power, he is [a] lord.”33  As a redeemed saint, an “inner man,” a 
Christian is utterly free in his conscience, utterly free in his innermost being.  He is like 
the greatest king on earth, who is above and beyond the power of everyone.  No earthly 
authority--whether pope, prince, or parent -- can impose “a single syllable of the law” 
upon him.34  No earthly authority can intrude upon the sanctuary of his conscience, can 
endanger his assurance and comfort of eternal life.  This is “the splendid privilege,” the 
“inestimable power and liberty” that every Christian enjoys.35   
On the other hand, Luther wrote, every Christian is a priest, who freely performs 
good works in service of his or her neighbor and in glorification of God.36  “Christ has 
made it possible for us, provided we believe in him, to be not only his brethren, co-heirs, 
and fellow-kings, but also his fellow-priests,” Luther wrote.  And thus, in imitation of 
Christ, we freely serve our neighbors, offering instruction, charity, prayer, admonition, 
and sacrifice.37  We abide by the law of God so far as we are able so that others may 
see our good work and be similarly impelled to seek God's grace.  We freely discipline 
and drive ourselves to do as much as good as we are able, not so that we may be 
saved but so that others may be served.  We live so far as we are able the life of the 
Beatitudes, the virtues of poverty, meekness, humility, mercy, and peacefulness.38  "A 
 
30 LW 31:344-354, 368-377. 
31 LW 31:345. 
32 Luther: Lectures on Romans (1515-1516), trans. Wilhelm Pauck (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1961), 120.  See also LW 23:146; LW 12:328-330; LW 8:9-12. 
33 LW 31:354. 
34 LW 36:70; see also LW 31:344-346. 
35 LW 31:355-358. 
36 LW 31:355-356; see also LW 36:112-116, 138-140; LW 40:21-23; LW 13:152; LW 39:137-224. 
37 LW 31:355; see also LW 36:241. 
38 LW 45:87.  
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man does not live for himself alone," Luther wrote, "he lives only for others."39  The 
precise nature of our priestly service to others depends upon our gifts and upon the 
vocation in which God calls us to use them.40  But we are all to serve freely and fully as 
God's priests.      
Such are the paradoxes of human nature, Luther believed.  We are at once 
sinners and saints; we are at once lords and servants.  We can do nothing good; we 
can do nothing but good.  We are utterly free; we are everywhere bound.  The more a 
person thinks himself a saint, the more sinful in fact he becomes.  The more a person 
thinks herself a sinner, the more saintly she in fact becomes.  The more a person acts 
like a lord, the more he is called to be a servant.  The more a person acts as a servant, 
the more in fact she has become a lord.  This is the paradoxical nature of human life.  
Luther’s first distinction between the saint and the sinner tracked closely his 
ontological distinction between the City of God and the City of Man, the reign and realm 
of Christ versus that of the Devil.  Sinners are earthly citizens.  Saints are heavenly 
citizens.  Every Christian is both a sinner and a saint.  Every Christian is a citizen of 
both the earthly and the heavenly kingdoms.  Earthly citizenship comes with birth.  
Heavenly citizenship comes through faith.  
Luther’s second distinction between free lord and priestly servant did not track 
his ontological distinctions so neatly.  In one sense, this lord-priest distinction was a 
description only of the Christian saint, only of a person as member of the heavenly 
kingdom.  Both lordship and priesthood after all were qualities of the Christian believer, 
the party who had been justified by faith, and had so become a citizen of the heavenly 
kingdom.  As lord, such a heavenly citizen was utterly free from the strictures and 
structures of the law of the earthly kingdom.  As priest, he or she was utterly free to do 
good works for neighbors, even if such works could never fully comply with God's Law.   
In another sense, however, the lord-priest distinction did track the two-kingdoms 
distinction.  To be a lord was to be above everyone in the earthly kingdom, to be “an 
inner man,” to “live for oneself alone,” to have the assurance and luxury of being in utter 
community and compability with God, above the sinful din of the earthly crowd.  To be a 
priest, however, was to be servant to everyone -- in the heavenly and the earthly 
kingdoms alike.  It was to be an “outer man,” a “person for the sake of others” -- not 
least those sinful non-believers of the earthly kingdom who will see in this service a 
reflection of and an invitation to a saintly Christian life in the heavenly kingdom.  
Luther’s doctrine of the priesthood of all believers did not connote a priesthood to 
believers only.  It connoted a priesthood by believers both to fellow believers in the 
heavenly kingdom and to non-believers in the earthly kingdom -- in imitation of Christ’s 
priestly service on earth.  As Luther put it: “The fact that we are all priests and kings 
means that each of us Christians may go before God and intercede for the other, asking 
God to give him his own faith.”41  Thus a Christian believer, in discharging the services 
of the priesthood of believers, inevitably moved between the heavenly and the earthly 
kingdoms.  
 
39 LW 31:364-5; see also LW 51:86-87. 
40 LW 38:188; LW 28:171-172.   
41 WA 10/3:108. 
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Theory of the Church 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory also drew to itself an ecclesiology, a theory of the 
two-fold nature of the church.  Parts of this ecclesiology we just saw foreshadowed in 
Luther’s discussion of a Christian as a saint of the heavenly kingdom and a priest of the 
earthly kingdom.  Other parts of this theory we saw earlier in Luther’s description of the 
church as one of the three natural orders of the earthly kingdom, and in his gradual 
acceptance of the early Catholic canon law as a legitimate norm for organizing the 
visible church.42   
Luther distinguished the invisible church of the heavenly kingdom from the visible 
church of the earthly kingdom.  For Luther, the “invisible church” was the communion of 
saints (communio sanctorum).  By communio, Luther meant a congregation or 
assembly of parties who were committed to the mutual sharing of all things and 
experiences in this life, not least Christ himself.43  By sanctorum, Luther meant primarily 
all those sinners who had accepted Christ in faith and had so become saints.  To be a 
saint was to be in community with other living persons who had accepted Christ in faith.  
It was also to be in communion with Christ and with all Christian believers who had died 
and had come into more perfect communion with Christ -- those “saints in heaven” 
described so graphically in the Bible’s Revelation of St. John.44  The communion of 
saints thus began imperfectly in this life and continued perfectly in the life to come.  The 
true church of the heavenly kingdom began temporally in this world of space and time, 
and continued eternally in the new world beyond space and time.   
The invisible church was a community of faith, hope, and love, Luther argued.45  
It featured a pure spiritual fellowship, a perennial ethic of mutual sharing and caring, 
each party ministering to the other in accordance with his or her special gifts.46  It was 
“the most divine, the most heavenly, the noblest fraternity, ... the community of holiness 
in which we are all brothers and sisters, so closely united that a closer relationship could 
not be conceived.  Herein we have one baptism, one Christ, one sacrament, one food, 
one Gospel, one faith, one spirit, one spiritual body, with each person being a member 
of the other.”47  While this spiritual church remained an aspirational ideal for the world, it 
could only be seen “through a glass darkly,” and only then by the keenest eyes of faith.  
“The church is indeed holy, but it is a sinner at the same time.”48  In the earthly kingdom, 
Luther wrote, “the church is absconded, the saints are hidden.”49 “Just as that rock 
[Jesus Christ], sinless, invisible and spiritual, is perceptible by faith alone so perforce 
the church is sinless, invisible and spiritual, perceptible by faith alone.”50   
 
42 On this, see Witte, Law and Protestantism, chaps 1-4.  
43 WA 7:219; WA 10/2:89; WA 28:149.   
44 See esp. LW 35:389-411. 
45 WA 6:131. 
46 WA 10/3:407ff.; WA 17/2:255. 
47 WA 2:756. 
48 WA 40/1: 197. 
49 WA 18:652.   
50 WA 7:710. 
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The actual church of the earthly kingdom is only a shadow of this shining ideal, 
Luther argued, but dependent upon this ideal church like a shadow is dependent upon 
light for its being and form.  The earthly church is comprised of both saints and sinners.  
Some are true believers, some are just imposters.  Sometimes the true believers 
behave as saints, other times they behave as sinners.  Thus God has established a 
visible church, as one of the orders of the earthly kingdom.  God has called this church 
to dispense his unique “gifts” to the earthly kingdom -- the preaching of the Word, the 
administration of the sacraments, the discipline of the keys.  All Christians, as members 
of the priesthood of all believers, have a general responsibility to help dispense these 
gifts.  But from within the universal priesthood of believers, God also calls some to be 
the “priests” of the church -- pastors, teachers, sextons and other church officers.  
These “priests” of the earthly church enjoy no special status in the earthly kingdom: like 
the parent and like the prince, they simply have a distinctive office, neither more nor 
less important to God than other offices in the earthly kingdom.  It was the responsibility 
of these priests, in tandem with the other earthly officers and orders, to see that the 
earthly church remained true to its office and faithful to its calling.51  This included 
adopting and adapting early canon law norms to structure and organize the visible 
church.  It also included adopting and enforcing moral codes for both the officers and 
members of the church.  
Theory of Knowledge 
Luther’s two kingdoms theory also drew to itself an epistemology, a theory of two 
sources and forms of knowledge.  In his early years, Luther often described this in his 
favorite language of Law and Gospel.  The knowledge of the Law brought death, the 
knowledge of the Gospel brought life.  The truth revealed by the Law is that we all are 
sinners.  The truth revealed by the Gospel is that we all can be saints.  To move from 
sinner to saint, from death to life, from the earthly kingdom to the heavenly kingdom 
required earnest cultivation and application of the knowledge of Christ taught in the 
Gospel.52   
In his later years, Luther also came to describe this epistemological distinction in 
terms of faith versus reason, of revealed knowledge versus hidden knowledge.  In the 
heavenly kingdom, Luther argued, God reveals himself directly through the Bible and 
through the Christian conscience.  God’s Word and will are utterly clear to all those who 
have true faith.  In the earthly kingdom, however, God is hidden, shrouded by the sin 
that has fallen over this kingdom.  God is the “absconded God” (deus absconditus), 
whose truth and knowledge are revealed and known only through “masks” (larvae).   
One such set of “masks,” Luther argued, is a person’s natural reason.53  Luther 
wrote: “God has placed human earthly life under the dominion of natural reason which 
has enough ability to rule physical things.  Reason and experience together teach … 
how to do everything else that belongs to sustaining life here on earth.  These powers 
have been graciously bestowed by God upon human reason.  God has seen to it that 
 
51 See esp. LW 40:325-347; LW 41:3-178; LW 38:188ff.  
52 This is the central thesis of Luther’s Commentary on Galatians (1535), which argument he summarized 
in LW 26:4-12.   
53 LW 1:66ff.   
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even the heathen is blessed with the gift of reason to help him live his daily life.”54  
Cultivation of one’s natural reason, however, Luther went on, not only enable us to 
survive in the earthly kingdom but also to prepare ourselves for the heavenly kingdom.  
“The light of reason is everywhere kindled by the divine light,” Luther declared.  “The 
light of reason is a part and beginning of the true light provided it recognizes and honors 
him by whom it is kindled.”  “For wherever reason goes, there the will follows.  And 
whereever the will goes, there love and desire follow.”55  But the devil, too, is hidden in 
human reason and will, and distorts the natural knowledge and truth that God has 
implanted.  Therefore, a person must not think that by willing to do good or by reasoning 
to find God, he or she will be able to move from the earthly kingdom to the heavenly 
kingdom, to attain salvation.56  Faith alone brings salvation.  Human reason and human 
will are always bound by sin -- a point Luther pressed with great alacrity in his debate 
with Erasmus over the "bondage of the will."57  “Reason when illuminated [by the Holy 
Spirit] helps faith by reflecting on something, but reason without faith isn’t and can’t be 
helpful.”58  
A second set of “masks” through which the hidden God can be partly seen in the 
earthly kingdom are the various offices of authority in the earthly orders of household, 
church, and state.  These offices not only rule the earthly kingdom on God’s behalf, as 
we saw.  These authorities also communicate God’s truth and knowledge, God’s word 
and will, so far as they are able.59  “[T]he magistrate, the emperor, the king, the prince, 
the counsul, the teacher, the preacher, the [parent] -- all these are masks [of God],” 
Luther argued.  God wants us to “respect and to acknowledge” them as His creatures 
and His teachers.  These authorities are competent to teach much that is needed for life 
in the earthly kingdom, and a rational person would do well to heed their instruction.  
“But when the issue is one involving religion, conscience, the fear of God, faith, and the 
worship of God, then we must not fear or trust any [such earthly] order or look to it for 
consolation or rescue, either physical or spiritual.”  This would “offend God,” and be a 
“denial of His truth.”60 
A third set of “masks” by which the hidden God is partly revealed is the 
conscientious work of Christian believers in the earthly kingdom.  It is the duty of 
Christians of all sorts “to work the work of God in the world,” Luther argued.61  As 
citizens of the earthly kingdom, Christians were not to withdraw ascetically from the 
“things of the world,” abstaining from its activities and institutions as certain Anabaptists 
of the day taught.62  Rather, Christians were to participate actively in these earthly 
institutions and activities, to confirm their natural origin and function, and to use human 
 
54 WA 16:353, using translation in Carter Lindberg, “’Christianization and Luther on the Early Profit 
Economy,” in John and Maxfield, ed., The Reformation as Christianization,  49-78, at 56.  See further 
William Lazarus, Christians in Society: Luther, the Bible, and Social Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2001). 
55 LW 52:57, 79. 
56 WA 7:73; see also WA 39:374; WA 40:42, 66. 
57 LW 33:295ff.  
58 WA TR 1, No. 71, LW 54:71. 
59 LW 26:94-96; LW 14:114; LW 24:67. 
60 LW 26:95-96. 
61 WA 31/1:437; WA 40/3:271ff.  
62 WA 21:342ff. 
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will and reason, however defective, to do as much good and to attain as much 
understanding as possible.  “God himself ordained and established this earthly realm 
and its distinctions,” Luther wrote.  “[W]e must remain and work in them so long as we 
are on earth.”63   
 
Theory of Righteousness 
Finally, the two-kingdoms theory drew to itself a soteriology, a theory of two 
forms of justice or righteousness and two corresponding uses of the law.  We have 
already seen the heart of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone: Sinners 
become saints, earthly citizens become heavenly citizens only through faith in Christ, 
Luther insisted.  No human works, however seemingly meritorious, will earn a person 
salvation.  Luther's discussion of two forms of righteousness and two uses of the law 
presented another dimension of this cardinal teaching, but now with an eye to 
explaining how and why good works might still be useful.   
Earthly righteousness, Luther taught, “the righteousness of law or of works,” is a 
natural righteousness whose norms, though ordained by God at creation, are perceived 
and carried out by the reason and will of sinners.  This, Luther variously called “active,” 
“proper” “political” or “civil” righteousness.  While this form of righteousness has no 
effect on one's citizenship in the heavenly kingdom, it does help to improve one's 
citizenship in the earthly kingdom.  Earthly life for oneself and for all others is more 
livable and tolerable if a person does good, rather than evil.  Heavenly righteousness, 
by contrast, “the righteousness of the Gospel or of faith,” is a spiritual righteousness in 
which God alone acts.  By grace, God inspires faith in a person's heart, and then by 
grace God responds to their faith, delivering them from sin and forgiving them.  Luther 
thus variously called this a form of "passive,” “alien,” or “foreign” righteousness.64  
Luther summarized:  
We set forth two worlds, one of them heavenly and the other 
earthly.  Into these we place two kinds of righteousness, which 
are distinct and separate from each other.  The righteousness 
of the Law is earthly and deals with earthly things; by it we 
perform good works.  But as the earth does not bring forth fruit 
unless it first has been watered and made fruitful from above 
... so also by the righteousness of the Law we do nothing even 
when we do much; we do not fulfill the Law, even when we 
fulfill it.  Without any merit or work of our own we must first be 
justified by Christian righteousness, which has nothing to do 
with the righteousness of the Law or with earthly and active 
righteousness. But this righteousness is heavenly and 
passive.  We do not have it of ourselves; we receive it from 
heaven.  We do not perform it; we accept it by faith, through 
which we ascend beyond all laws and works.65 
 
63 WA 32:390. 
64 WA 1:293ff.; LW 5:213ff.; 12:328ff.; LW 31:297-306.     
65 LW 26:8. 
 15 
 
The corrollary to this doctrine of the two forms of righteousness was the doctrine 
of the two uses of the law.66  Once it is granted that salvation does not depend upon the 
works of the Law, the question arises:  Why does God continue to maintain the Law of 
God and the law of the magistrate?  What are, from God’s point of view, its “uses” in the 
life of the earthly kingdom?  Luther set forth two uses of the law, and touched on a third.    
One use of the law, Luther argued, is to restrain people from sinful conduct by 
threat of punishment.67  Luther called this the “civil” or “political” use of the law.  God 
wants even the worst of sinners to observe the law -- to honor their parents, to avoid 
killing and stealing, to respect marriage vows, to testify truthfully, and the like -- so that 
“some measure of earthly order, concourse and concord may be preserved.”68  Sinners, 
not naturally inclined to observe the law, may be induced to do so by fear of 
punishment -- divine punishment as well as human punishment.  “Stern hard civil rule is 
necessary in the world,” Luther wrote, “lest the world be destroyed, peace vanish, and 
commerce and common interest be destroyed.”69  He emphasized that to maintain order 
it is important that there be precise legal rules, not only to deter lawbreakers but also to 
restrain magistrates from their natural inclination to wield their powers arbitrarily.70  This 
first use of the law applied both to the Law of God and to the law of the magistrate.  It 
induced in earthly citizens a “civil” or “political righteousness,” a justice of law.   
A second use of the law is to make people conscious of their duty to give 
themselves completely to God while at the same time making them aware of their utter 
inability to fulfill that duty without divine help.  Luther called this the “theological use” of 
the law.  The law in this sense serves as a mirror in which a sinner can reflect upon his 
depravity and to see behind him the beckoning hand of a gracious God ready to forgive 
him and welcome him into the heavenly kingdom.  Through the law the sinful person is 
induced to acknowledge his sin and to seek God's gracious forgiveness.71  Here Luther 
relied on St. Paul’s explanation of the significance of the law -- to make persons 
conscious of their inherent sinfulness and to bring them to repentance.72  Luther 
sometimes put this in harsh terms: “The true office and the chief and proper use of the 
law is to reveal to man his sin, blindness, misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate, 
contempt of God, death, hell, judgment, and the well-deserved wrath of God.... When 
the law is being used correctly, it does nothing but reveal sin, work wrath, accuse, 
terrify, and reduce minds to the point of despair.”73  From out of the depths of this 
despair, the sinner will cry to God for forgiveness and salvation.  This second use of the 
 
66 On the uses of the law in Luther and Lutheran thought, see detailed sources and discussions in Edward 
Engelbrecht, Friends of the Law: Luther’s Use of the Law for the Christian Life (St. Louis, MO: Concordia 
Publishing House, 2011). 
67 Luther generally spoke of the “civil use” as the “first use of the law,” and the “theological use” as the 
“second use of the law,” though the latter was the more important to him.  See WA 10:454ff.; WA 
40:486ff. 
68 WA 10:454; see also WA 11:251.  
69 WA 15:302. 
70 WA TR 3, No. 3911. 
71 See, e.g., WA, 40:481-86.   
72 See esp. Romans 7:7-25; Galatians 3:19-22 and discussion in WA 16:363-93.   
73 WA 40:481.  
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law applied primarily to the Law of God, though the laws of a true Christian magistrate 
could have the same effect.  It induced in persons a "passive righteousness," a justice 
of faith, a recognition that one is entirely helpless in his own pursuit of heaven, and 
needs only have faith in God’s grace to be saved. 
Luther also touched lightly on a third use of the law.  This use, grounded in St. 
Paul's discussion of the law as "our teacher to bring us unto Christ" (Galatians 3:24), 
became known in the Protestant world as the “educational” or “pedagogical” use of the 
law.74  Law, in this sense, serves to teach the faithful, those who have already been 
justified by faith, the good works that please God.  Luther recognized this concept 
without explicitly expounding a doctrine of the third use of the law.  He recognized that 
those who are justified by faith remain sinful and in need of God's constant instruction 
through the law.  He recognized that sermons, commentaries, and catechism lessons 
on the many Old Testament passages on law are directed, in no small part, to teaching 
the faithful the meaning of God's law.75  He wrote cryptically early in his career of the 
"three-fold use of the law."76  Later, in his Table Talk, he distinguished among "written 
law," "oral law," and "spiritual law" and then wrote, that the spiritual law "touches the 
heart and moves it, so that a man not only ceases to persecute, but ... desires to be 
better.”77  It is clear that, for Luther, law could serve not only as a harness against sin 
and an inducement to faith but also as a teacher of Christian virtue.  But Luther never 
systematically expounded a third use of the law, in ways that Philipp Melanchthon, John 
Calvin, and many Protestant theologians and jurists did after 1535.  
  
Implications for Theories of Law, Politics and Society 
This elegant dialectical theology provided the framework for several fundamental 
reforms of traditional theories of society, politics, and law in the German and 
Scandavian lands where Lutheran theology become influential.     
Social Implications.  Luther's two kingdoms theory was a rejection of traditional 
hiearchical theories of being, authority, and society.  For centuries, the Christian West 
had taught that God's creation is fundamentally hierarchical in structure -- a vast chain 
of being emanating from God and extending down through the various kingdoms of 
humans, animals, plants, and physical things.  In this great chain of being, each 
 
74 See sources and discussion in Witte, God’s Joust, God’s Justice, 263-94.   
75 In his Large Catechism (1529), which he described as “a set of instructions for the daily lives of 
Christian believers,” Luther devoted more than fifty pages to exegesis of the Decalogue, concluding that 
“outside of the Ten Commandments, no work can be good or pleasing to God, however great or precious 
it may appear in the eyes of the world.”  Triglott Concordia: The Symbolic Books of the Ev. Lutheran 
Church German-Latin-English (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1921), 670-71.  He included 
a similar exegesis in his Treatise on Good Works (1520), WA 6:196ff., and his Disputations Against the 
Antinomians (1539), LW 47:99ff. 
76 In his 1522 Commentary on Galatians 3, Luther spoke of "three-fold use of the law" (drey wysse am 
brauch des gesetz), though in this tract as well as his 1531 Commentary on Galatians, he focused only 
on the civil and theological uses of the law.  WA 10/1:449, 457.  Martin Bucer, in his 1525 Latin translation 
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reformers adopted.  WA 10/1:457 n.2. 
77 The Table Talk or Familiar Discourses of Martin Luther, trans. W. Hazlitt (London: D. Bouge, 1848), 
135-36.  See also WA 38:310. 
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creature found its place and its purpose, and the whole creation found its natural 
order.78  And in this chain of being, human society found its natural order and hierarchy.  
It was thus simply the nature of things that some persons and institutions were higher 
on this chain of being, some lower.  It was the nature of things that some were closer 
and had more access to God, and some were further away and in need of greater 
mediation in their relationship with God.  This was one basis for traditional arguments of 
the superiority of the pope to the emperor, of the clergy to the laity, of the canon law to 
the civil law, of the church to the state.  It was also one basis for the hierarchical 
doctrine of purgatory and paradise depicted so graphically in Dante’s Divine Comedy -- 
that vast hierarchy of purgation and sanctification that a confessed sinner slowly 
ascended in the afterlife in pursuit of recommunion with God.  
Luther's two-kingdoms theory turned this traditional ontology onto its side.  By 
separating the two kingdoms, Luther highlighted the radical separation between the 
Creator and the creation, and between God and humanity.  For Luther, the fall into sin 
destroyed the original continuity and communion between the Creator and the creation, 
the tie between the heavenly kingdom and the earthly kingdom.  There was no series of 
emanations of being from God to humanity.  There was no stairway of merit from 
humanity to God.  There was no purgatory.  There was no heavenly hierarchy.  God is 
present in the heavenly kingdom, and is revealed in the earthly kingdom primarily 
through "masks."  Persons are born into the earthly kingdom, and have access to the 
heavenly kingdom only through faith.   
Luther did not deny the traditional view that the earthly kingdom retains its natural 
order, despite the fall into sin.  There remained, in effect, a chain of being, an order of 
creation that gave each creature, especially each human creature and each natural 
institution, its proper place and purpose in this life.  But, for Luther, this chain of being 
was horizontal, not hierarchical.  Before God, all persons and all institutions in the 
earthly kingdom were by nature equal.  Luther's earthly kingdom was a flat regime, a 
horizontal realm of being, with no person and no institution obstructed or mediated by 
any other in access to and accountability before God.   
Second, and related, Luther's two-kingdoms theory turned the traditional 
hierarchical theory of human society onto its side.  For many centuries, the Church had 
taught that the clergy were superior to the laity.  The clergy were, to adapt Luther's 
language, special officers of the higher heavenly realm of grace, while the laity were 
simply members of the lower earthly realm of nature.  As members of the higher 
heavenly realm, the clergy had readier access to God and God’s mysteries.  They thus 
mediated the channel of grace between the laity and God -- dispensing God’s grace 
through the sacraments and preaching, and interceding for God’s grace by hearing 
confessions, receiving charity, and offering prayers on behalf of the laity.  In this sense, 
the lowliest cleric was superior to the noblest emperor.  All the clergy, from the lowliest 
 
78 See Arthur Lovejoy, The Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1933).  On the legal and ecclesiological implications of this ontology, see Brian Tierney, 
Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought: 1150-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 8ff.; id., Foundations of Conciliar Theory: The Contributions of the Medieval Canonists from 
Gratian to the Great Schism, enlarged new ed. (Leiden/New York: Brill, 1998), 98ff. 
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parson to the greatest pope, were exempt from earthly laws, taxes, and other duties, 
and foreclosed from earthly pursuits such as marriage and family life.  
Luther rejected this traditional social theory.  Clergy and laity were fundamentally 
equal before God and before all others, he argued.  Luther’s doctrine of the priesthood 
of all believers at once “laicized” the clergy and “clericized” the laity.  It treated the 
traditional “clerical” office of preaching and teaching as just one other vocation 
alongside many others that a conscientious Christian could properly and freely pursue.  
He treated all traditional “lay” offices as forms of divine calling and priestly vocation, 
each providing unique opportunities for service to one’s peers.  Preachers and teachers 
of the visible church must carry their share of civic duties and pay their share of civil 
taxes just like everyone else.  And they could and should  participate in earthly activities 
such as marriage and family life just like everyone else.79  
Luther expanded on this natural egalitarianism with his robust understanding of 
the Christian "calling" (Beruf) or "vocation" (vocatio).  Every “good, decent, and useful” 
occupation in which a Christian conscientiously engages should be treated as a 
Christian vocation, Luther believed.  Each vocation was an equally virtuous and 
effective calling of God, though none was a pathway to salvation.80  Both the carpenter 
and the prince, the mineworker and the judge, the housewife and the banker should 
accept their Christian responsibility to perform their tasks conscientiously and, so far as 
possible, in the service of God and others.81  Public officials, in particular, Luther 
argued, have a special calling to serve the community.  This calling might require them 
to adopt a Christian social ethic that differs from a Christian personal ethic.  A 
Christian’s duty in his direct relationship with God “as a private person, a person for 
himself alone,” is to love his enemy and to suffer injustice and abuse from his neighbor 
without resistance and without revenge.  As a public person, serving in such offices as 
the military or the judiciary, however, a Christian might well be required to resist his 
neighbor and to avenge injustice and abuse, even to the point of violence and 
bloodshed.82  
Luther did not press his natural egalitarianism to communitarian extremes.  He 
saw no incompatability between insisting on the equal status of all persons and 
vocations before God, and accepting the ample disparities in wealth, power, privilege, 
and respectability among persons and positions in daily life.  Some are more blessed, 
some less so.  Some work harder, some play more.  Some enjoy goods, some spurn 
them.  Some start with noble inheritances, some start with nothing.  Some vocations 
require more pageantry and property than others.  None of these empirical disparities, 
however, changes the normative reality of human equality before God. 
Political Implications.  Luther's two-kingdoms theory also turned the traditional 
hierarchical theory of spiritual and temporal authority onto its side.  For centuries, the 
Church had taught that the pope is the vicar of Christ, in whom Christ has vested the 
 
79 See John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition, 
2d ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 113-58.  
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81 See detailed sources and discussion in Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation, Carl C. Rasmussen, trans. 
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“plentitude of his power.”  This power was symbolized in the “two swords” discussed in 
Luke 22:38 -- the spiritual and the temporal swords.  Christ had handed these two 
swords to the highest being in the human world -- the pope, the vicar of Christ.  The 
pope and his clerical delegates wielded the spiritual sword, in part by establishing canon 
law rules for the governance of all of Christendom.  The pope, however, was too holy to 
wield the temporal sword.  He thus delegated this sword to those authorities below the 
spiritual realm--emperors, kings, dukes, and their civil retinues.  These civil magistrates 
were to promulgate and enforce civil laws in a manner consistent with canon law and 
other Church teachings.  Under this two swords theory, civil law was by its nature 
inferior to canon law.  Civil jurisdiction was subordinate to ecclesiastical jurisdiction.  
Political authority was subordinate to clerical authority.83   
Luther rejected this hierarchical view of government.  For Luther, the earthly 
kingdom featured three natural forms and forums of government: the domestic, 
ecclesiastical, and political, or, in modern terms, the family, the church, and the state.  
These three institutions stood equal before God, and were each called directly by God 
to discharge complementary tasks in the earthly kingdom.  The family was called to rear 
and nurture children, to teach and to discipline them, to cultivate and exemplify love and 
charity within the home and the broader community.  The church was called to preach 
the word, to administer the sacraments, to discipline their wayward members.  The state 
was called to protect peace, punish crime, promote the common good, and to support 
the church, family, and other institutions derived from them. 
Not only were these three estates equal, rather than hierarchical, in authority, 
status, and responsibility, Luther argued.  Only the state had legal authority -- the 
authority of the sword to pass and enforce positive laws for the governance of the 
earthly kingdom.  Contrary to the two-swords theory, Luther emphasized that the church 
was not a law-making authority.  The church had no sword.  It had no jurisdiction.  It had 
no business involving itself in the day-to-day administration of law or in the vesting of 
magistrates in their offices.  The church’s ministry and mission lay elsewhere.  To be 
sure, each local church needed internal rules of order and discipline to govern its 
members and officers, and external legal structures to protect its polity and property.  
But it was up to the local magistrate to pass and enforce these ecclesiastical laws, in 
consultation and cooperation with the local clergy and theologians.  And, to be sure, 
church officers and theologians had to be vigilant in preaching and teaching the law of 
God to magistrates and subjects alike, and in pronouncing prophetically against 
injustice, abuse, and tyranny.  But formal legal authority lay with the state, not with the 
church.84 
Luther was more concerned with the function than with the form of the state.  
Luther had, at first, hoped that the emperor would endorse the Reformation, and 
 
83 On medieval formulations, see Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, repr. ed., F.W. 
Maitland, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 7-21; Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political 
Ideas, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Paul, 1954), 2:506-538 and key documents in Brian Tierney, The 
Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1964); Lester L. Field, Liberty, Dominion, 
and the Two Swords: On the Origins of Western Political Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1998).  
84 LW 45:105ff.; LW 36:106ff. 
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accordingly included in his early writings some lofty panegyrics on the imperial 
authorities of the Holy Roman Empire of his day and of the Christian Roman Empire of 
a millenium before.  When the emperor failed him, Luther turned at various times to the 
nobility, the peasantry, the city councils, and the princes, and in turn wrote favorably 
about each of them, and then sometimes unfavorably when they failed him.85  Luther 
ultimately did not care if the rulers were Christians, let alone Lutherans, so long as they 
ruled fairly and left the church and its members free to do their callings.  “It is not 
necessary for the emperor to be a saint.  It is not necessary for him to be a Christian to 
rule.  It is sufficient for the emperor to possess reason.”86   
Luther’s political teachings must be read in their immediate political context, 
however, and not used to paint Luther as a theorist of political absolutism, or elitist 
oligarchy, or constitutional democracy.  Luther had no firm theory of the forms of 
political office.  He did not sort out systematically the relative virtues and vices of 
monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy.  He spent very little time on the thorny 
constitutional questions of the nature and purpose of executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers, let alone finer questions of checks and balances, judicial review, and other 
such questions that occupied other sixteenth-century Protestant and humanist writers.87  
These were not Luther’s primary concern. 
Luther was more concerned with the general status and function of the political 
office -- both before God and within the community.  On the one hand, Luther believed, 
the magistrate was God’s vice-regent in the earthly kingdom, called to elaborate and 
enforce God’s Word and will, to reflect God’s justice and judgment on earthly citizens.  
The magistracy was, in this sense, a “divine office,” a “holy estate,” a “Godly calling,” 
within the earthly kingdom.  Indeed, the magistrate was a “god” on earth, as Psalm 82:6 
put it, to be obeyed as if God himself.88  “Law and earthly government are a great gift of 
God to mankind,” Luther wrote with ample flourish.  “Earthly authority is an image, 
shadow, and figure of the dominion of Christ.”  Indeed, “a pious jurist” who served 
faithfully in the Christian magistrate’s retinue is “a prophet, priest, angel, and savior ... in 
the earthly kingdom.”89   
The magistrate and his retinue not only represented God’s authority and majesty, 
however.  They also exercised God’s judgment and wrath against human sin. “Princes 
and magistrates are the bows and arrows of God,” Luther wrote, equipped to hunt down 
God’s enemies in the earthly kingdom.90  The hand of the Christian magistrate, judge, or 
soldier “that wields the sword and slays is not man's hand, but God's; and it is not man, 
but God, who hangs, tortures, beheads, slays, and fights.  All these are God’s works 
and judgments.”91     
 
85 See variously, K. Trϋdinger, Luthers Briefe und Gutachten an weltliche Obrigkeit zur Durchfuhrung der 
Reformation (Mϋnster: Aschendorff, 1975). 
86 WA 27:418. 
87 See Quentin Skinner, The Foundation of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978); John Witte, Jr., The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in 
Early Modern Calvinism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chaps. 2-5. 
88 See LW 2:139ff.; LW 13:44ff.; LW 44:92ff.; LW 45:85ff.; LW 46:237ff. 
89 WA 30/2:554.  
90 LW 17:171. 
91 WA 19:626.  See also WA 6:267; LW 45:113; LW 46:95ff.  
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On the other hand, Luther believed, the magistrate was the “father of the 
community” (Landesvater, paterpoliticus).  He was to care for his political subjects as if 
they were his children, and his political subjects were to “honor” him as if he were their 
parent.92  This was the essence of the ordo politicus, of the political authorities and their 
subjects that comprise “the state.”  Like a loving father, the magistrate was to keep the 
peace and to protect his subjects from threats or violations to their persons, properties, 
and reputations.93  He was to deter his subjects from abusing themselves through 
drunkenness, sumptuousness, prostitution, gambling, and other vices.94  He was to 
nurture and sustain his subjects through the community chest, the public almshouse, 
the state-run hospice.  He was to educate them through the public school, the public 
library, the public lectern.  He was to see to their spiritual needs by supporting the 
ministry of the locally established church, and encouraging their attendance and 
participation through the laws of Sabbath observance, tithing, and holy days.  He was to 
see to their material needs by reforming inheritance and property laws to ensure more 
even distribution of the parents’ property among all children.  He was to set an example 
of virtue, piety, love, and charity in his own home and private life for his faithful subjects 
to emulate and to respect.  The Christian magistrate was to complement and support 
the God-given responsibilities of parents and family members for their children and 
dependents, without intruding on the paternal office.  And he was to support the 
preaching and sacramental life of the local church without trespassing on the 
ecclesiastical office, let alone that of the invisible church of the heavenly kingdom.95    
These twin metaphors of the Christian magistrate -- as the lofty vice-regent of 
God and as the loving father of the community -- described the basics of Luther’s 
political theory.  For Luther political authority was divine in origin, but earthly in 
operation.  It expressed God’s harsh judgment against sin but also his tender mercy for 
sinners.  It communicated the Law of God but also the lore of the local community.  It 
depended upon the church for prophetic direction but it took over from the church all 
jurisdiction -- governance of marriage, education, poor relief and other earthly subjects 
traditionally governed by the Church’s canon law.  Either metaphor standing alone could 
be a recipe for abusive tyranny or officious paternalism.  But both metaphors together 
provided Luther and his followers with the core ingredients of a robust Christian 
republicanism and budding Christian welfare state. 
 
Legal Implications.  Luther’s two-kingdoms theory effectively “flattened” the 
traditional hierarchical theories of being and order, of clergy and laity, of ecclesiastical 
and political authority.  His earthly kingdom was a horizontal realm with each person, 
each order, and each official called directly by God to discharge discrete offices and 
vocations.  What kept this earthly kingdom and its activities intact, Luther believed, was 
the Law of God, and its elaboration by earthly authorities and subjects.   
Luther defined the Law of God as the set of norms ordained by God in the 
creation, written by God on the hearts of all persons, and rewritten by God on the pages 
 
92 WA 30/1:152ff.; LW 13:58ff.; LW 44:81-99. 
93 LW 13:44ff; LW 45:88ff., 103; LW 46:225ff. 
94 LW 44:95ff., 212ff.; LW 46:94ff. 
95 LW 45:83-84, 104-113; cf. LW 36:106-117.  See further discussion and sources in Witte, Law and 
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of the Bible.  Luther called this variously the “law of nature,” “natural law,” “divine law,” 
“Godly law,” “the law of the heart,” “the teachings of conscience,” “the inner law,” among 
others.96  His main point was that God’s natural law set at creation continued to operate 
after the fall into sin, and that it provided the foundation for all positive law and public 
morality in the earthly kingdom.  Natural law was another one of those “masks” of God 
in the earthly kingdom. 
The natural law defined the basic obligations that a person owed to God, 
neighbor, and self.  The clearest expression of these obligations, for Luther, was the 
Ten Commandments which God inscribed on two tables and gave to Moses on Mt. 
Sinai.  The First Table of the Decalogue set out basic obligations to honor the Creator 
God, to respect God’s name, to observe the Sabbath, to avoid idolatry and blasphemy.  
The Second Table set out basic obligations to respect one’s neighbor -- to honor 
authorities, and not to kill, commit adultery, steal, bear false witness, or covet.97  Luther 
believed this to be a universal statement of the natural law binding not only on the Jews 
of the Old Testament but on everyone. “The Decalogue is not the law of Moses ... but 
the Decalogue of the whole world, inscribed and engraved in the minds of all men from 
the foundation of the world.”98  “[W]hoever knows the Ten Commandments perfectly 
must know all the Scriptures, so that, in all affairs and cases, he can advise, help, 
comfort, judge, and decide both spiritual and temporal matters, and is qualified to sit in 
judgment upon all doctrines, estates, spirits, laws, and whatever else is in the world.”99  
And again: “[A]lthough the Decalogue was given in a particular way and place and 
ceremony, ... all nations acknowledge that there are sins and iniquities.”100  
Knowledge of this natural law comes not only through revealed Scripture, Luther 
argued, but also through natural reason – another one of those “masks” by which the 
hidden God is partly revealed in the earthly kingdom.  Luther built on St. Paul’s notion 
that even the heathen have a “law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing 
witness” to a natural knowledge of good and evil (Rom. 2:15).  Every rational person 
thus “feels” and “knows” the law of God, even if only obliquely.  The basic teaching of 
the natural law “lives and shines in all human reason, and if people would only pay 
attention to it, what need would they have of books, teachers, or of law?  For they carry 
with them in the recesses of the heart a living book which would tell them more than 
enough about what they ought to do, judge, accept, and reject.”101  
But sinful persons do not, of their own accord, “pay attention” to the natural law 
written on their hearts, and rewritten in the Bible.  Thus God has called upon other 
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persons and authorities in the earthly kingdom to elaborate its basic requirements.  All 
Christians, as priests to their peers, must communicate the natural law of God by word 
and by deed.  Parents must teach it to their children and dependents.  Preachers must 
preach it their congregants and catechumens.  And magistrates must elaborate and 
enforce it through their positive laws and public policies.  
The magistrate’s elaboration and enforcement of the natural law was particularly 
important, Luther believed, since only the magistrate held formal legal authority in the 
earthly kingdom.  “Natural law is a practical first principle in the realm of public morality,” 
Luther wrote; “it forbids evil and commands good.  Positive law is a decision that takes 
local conditions into account,” and “credibly” elaborates the general principles of the 
natural law into specific precepts to fit these local conditions.  “The basis of natural law 
is God, who has created this light, but the basis of positive law is the earthly authority,” 
the magistrate, who represents God in this earthly kingdom.102  The magistrate must 
promulgate and enforce these positive laws by combining faith, reason, and tradition.  
He must pray to God earnestly for wisdom and instruction.  He must maintain “an 
untrammelled reason” in judging the needs of his people and the advice of his 
counsellors.103  He must consider the wisdom of the legal tradition -- particularly that of 
Roman law, which Luther called a form of “heathen wisdom.”104  “The polity and the 
economy” of the earthly kingdom, Luther wrote, “are subject to reason.  Reason has first 
place.  There [one finds] civil laws and civil justice.”105  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Luther’s two-kingdoms theory was a theory of being, of the person, of the church, 
of knowledge, and of righteousness all at once – or, in loftier academic language, an 
ontology, anthropology, ecclesiology, epistemology, and soteriology.  God has ordained 
two kingdoms or realms in which humanity is destined to live, the earthly kingdom and 
the heavenly kingdom.  The earthly kingdom is the realm of creation, of natural and civic 
life, where a person operates primarily by reason and law.  The heavenly kingdom is the 
realm of redemption, of spiritual and eternal life, where a person operates primarily by 
faith and love.  These two kingdoms embrace parallel forms of righteousness and 
justice, government and order, truth and knowledge.  They interact and depend upon 
each other in a variety of ways.  But these two kingdoms ultimately remain distinct.  The 
earthly kingdom is distorted by sin, and governed by the Law.  The heavenly kingdom is 
renewed by grace and guided by the Gospel.  A Christian is a citizen of both kingdoms 
at once and invariably comes under the distinctive government of each.  As a heavenly 
citizen, the Christian remains free in his or her conscience, called to live fully by the light 
of the Word of God.  But as an earthly citizen, the Christian is bound by law, and called 
to obey the natural orders and offices of household, state, and church that God has 
ordained and maintained for the governance of this earthly kingdom. 
 
102 WA TR 3, No. 3911; see also WA 51:211. 
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 Luther’s two kingdoms theory helped render the Lutheran Reformation of 
Germany and Scandavania reformation, not only of theology and the church, but also of 
law and the state.  It is worth sketching out this latter reform a bit by way of conclusion, 
for it helps to situate the locations of the hidden God in the earthly kingdom, to illustrate 
the  distinctive Lutheran form of “secularization” that has been so foundational to 
Germany and the Nordic lands.   
The Lutheran Reformation brought fundamental changes to legal and political 
life.  Lutheran reformers pressed to radical conclusions the theological concept of the 
magistrate as the father of the community, called by God to enforce both tables of the 
Decalogue for his political children.  This idea helped to trigger a massive shift in power 
and property from the church to the state, and ultimately introduced enduring systems of 
state established churches, schools, and social welfare institutions.  Lutheran reformers 
replaced the traditional idea of marriage as a sacrament with a new idea of the marital 
household as a social estate to which all persons are called -- clerical and lay alike.  On 
that basis, the reformers developed a new civil law of marriage, featuring requirements 
of parental consent, state registration, church consecration, and peer presence for valid 
marital formation as well as absolute divorce on grounds of adultery, desertion, and 
other faults, with subsequent rights to remarriage.  Lutheran reformers replaced the 
traditional understanding of education as a teaching office of the church with a new 
understanding of the public school as a "civic seminary" for all persons to prepare for 
their distinctive vocations.  On that basis, magistrates replaced clerics as the chief rulers 
of education, civil law replaced canon law as the principal law of education, and the 
general callings of all Christians replaced the special calling of the clergy as the 
principal goal of education.   
A good deal of modern Nordic and broader Western law of marriage, education, 
and social welfare still bears the unmistakable marks of Lutheran Reformation theology.  
Today, in most Western legal systems, marriage is still viewed as both a civil and a 
spiritual institution, whose formation and dissolution require special legal procedures.  
Parents must still consent to the marriages of their minor children.  Peers must still 
attest to the veracity of the marital oath.  Pastors or political officials must still confirm 
the marital union, if not consecrate it.  Divorce and annulment still require a special 
public proceeding before a tribunal, with proof of support for dependent spouses and 
children.   
Today, in most Western legal systems, basic education remains a fundamental 
right of the citizen to procure and a fundamental duty of the state to provide.  Literacy 
and learning are still considered a prerequisite for individual flourishing and communal 
participation.  Society still places a heavy burden on those who shirk education 
voluntarily.  The state is still considered to be the essential monitor of civil education, 
which task it discharges directly through its own public or common schools or indirectly 
through its accreditation and supervision of private schools.   
Today, in most Western legal systems, care for the poor and needy remains an 
essential office of the state and an essential calling of the citizen.  The rise of the 
modern Western welfare state over the past century is in no small measure a new 
institutional expression of the Lutheran ideal of the magistrate as the father of the 
community called to care for all his political children.  The concurrent rise of the modern 
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philanthropic citizen is in no small measure a modern institutional expression of Luther’s 
ideal of the priesthood of all believers, each called to give loving service to neighbors.  
Sixteenth-century Lutherans and twenty-first century Westerners seem to share the 
assumption that the state has a role to play not only in fighting wars, punishing crime, 
and keeping peace, but also in providing education and welfare, fostering charity and 
morality, facilitating worship and piety.  They also seem to share the assumption that 
law has not only a basic use of coercing citizens to accept a morality of duty but also a 
higher use of inducing citizens to pursue a morality of aspiration.  
A good deal of the modern Nordic and Western struggle with law, however, is 
also part of the legal legacy of the Lutheran Reformation.  For example the Lutheran 
reformers removed the church as the spiritual ruler in expression of their founding ideals 
of religious liberty.  But they ultimately anointed the state as the new spiritual ruler in 
expression of their new doctrines of Christian republicanism.  Ever since, Germany and 
other Nordic lands have been locked in a bitter legal struggle to eradicate state 
establishments of religion and to guarantee religious freedom for all.  Similarly, Lutheran 
reformers removed clerics as mediators between God and the laity, in expression of St. 
Peter’s teaching of the priesthood of all believers.  But they ultimately interposed 
husbands between God and their wives, in expression of St. Paul’s teaching of male 
headship within the home.  The Lutheran reformers outlawed monasteries and cloisters.  
But these reforms also ended the vocations of many single women, placing a new 
premium on the vocation of marriage.  Ever since, Protestant women have been locked 
in a bitter legal struggle to gain fundamental equality both within the marital household 
and without -- a struggle that has still not ended in more conservative Protestant 
communities today.  
Luther’s legal legacy therefore should be neither unduly romanticized nor unduly 
condemned.  Those who champion Luther as the father of liberty, equality, and fraternity 
might do well to remember his ample penchant for elitism, statism, and chauvinism.  
Those who see the reformers only as belligerent allies of repression should recognize 
that they were also benevolent agents of welfare.  Prone as he was to dialectic 
reasoning, and aware as he was of the inherent virtues and vices of human 
achievements, Luther would likely have reached a comparable assessment.  
 
